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ARGUMENT 
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P provides: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts, without a 
jury . • ., the court shall find the facts especially 
and states separately its conclusions of law thereon . ." 
In the present case, however, a number of the trial court 
findings of fact are in reality conclusions of law. This 
court is of course not bound by the lower court's conclusion 
of law. Coronado Min. Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 577 P2d 
957 (Utah 1978). The Findings of fact which are in reality 
conclusions of law cannot be given effect as findings even 
though included with the Findings of Fact. Hailey vs. 
Riley, 14 Idaho 481, 95 P. 686 (1908). This court has held 
before that the so called findings were merely a blending 
of conclusions of fact and conclusions of law, interspensed 
with some ultimate facts. Brown v. Johnson, 43 Utah 
834, P590 (1983). 
In determining the character of the finding, the court 
will look to the substance thereof rather than its classifi-
cation. Conclusions drawn by the court in the exercise of 
its legal judgment from facts found by it are conclusions of 
law, although denoted findings of fact. Nolan vs. N.Y.,N. 
Y & H.R. Co., 70 Conn 159, 39A 115 (1898); Ferree vs. 
Dorrick Co., 62 Wash. 2D 5761, 383 P 2d 900 (1963); Hoke v. 
Stevens-Norton, Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 775, 375 P 2d 743 (1962), 
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and also the findings of insufficiency of evidence to 
support a finding of fact is properly a conclusion of law 
rather than finding of fact and is for this court to 
decidef Coronado Min. Corp. vs. Marathon Oil Co. 577 P 2d 
957 (1978). 
FINDING OF FACT #10 
This court should find that the trial court's No. 10 
findings of fact is in reality a conclusion of law and 
that this court is not bound by this conclusion of law of 
the lower court. Evidence in the transcript in fact 
indicates the fact in this case is an incorrect conclusion 
of law and it should be reversed. In the event this court 
finds that the lower court's findings of fact No. 10 is 
a finding of fact then this court should reverse the 
lower court and find the evidence in the record does not 
support this finding of fact. The lower court's findings 
of fact No.10 states: 
The contract was subject to the following conditions 
agreed to both by PSC and K. E. Systems. "The first 
purchase order is contingent upon HAFB's acceptance of 
the equipment approval and conditions." The contract 
did not contain any limit on the time in which o~ the 
number of submittals by which PSC could seek HAFB 
approval." 
This statement is inaccurate because it is incomplete and 
therefore not supported by the evidence in the record. 
While it is true the contract did not spell out any limits 
on the time in which or the number of submittals by which 
PSC could seek HAFB's approval/ it is also true that the 
contract between HAFB and K.E. Systems required that K. E. 
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Systems complete the manufacture and delivery of the 
equipment within a twenty-two week period* PSC knew of this 
twenty-two week deadline faced by K.E. Systems. (Transcript 
P. 337, 554 thru 556) Thus, PSC knew it had to obtain 
the approval of HAFB within a very limited time and that the 
number of submittals and the time it could use to gain an 
approval were extremely limited. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 31 
This finding of fact should be characterized 
not in substance as a finding of fact but in actuality 
as a conclusion of law. As suchf this court is free to 
review the record and come to its own conclusion of law. 
This conclusion of law reached by the lower court was 
incorrect for the various reasons submitted below. Even 
if this court characterizes the lower courtfs findings of 
fact No. 31 as a true finding of fact it is not substan-
tiated by the evidence in the record. The lower court 
erred in its part in its findings of fact No. 31 in the 
same manner and for the same reason as in its finding of 
fact No. 10. Finding of Fact No. 31 reads as follows: 
"By reason of the acts of K.E. Systems and PSC as set 
forth above, a course of dealings was established 
whereby (a) PSC would make a submittal, (b) K.E. 
Systems would forward this submittal to HAFB, (c) HAFB 
would review the submittal and would designate 
approval or disapproval, (d) HAFB would then return 
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the submittal and cover sheet to K.E. Syustems and (e) 
K.E. Systems would forward the reviewed submittal and 
cover sheet to PSC for response to the disapproved 
items in the resubmittal. A contract did not provide 
the number of times PSC would be permitted to make 
submittals and four submittals by PSC was not 
unreasonable." 
Againf PSC knew that K.E. Systems was under a strict 
time schedule because of the contract between HAFB and K.E. 
Systems. Mr. Glendonf the representative of PSC received the 
first submittal about the 11th or 12th of September, 1984. 
Mr. Glendon was advised of the third rejection on the 26th 
of October, 1984. (Transcript -00473) Thus between the time 
PSC received the first submittal and the time PSC received 
the rejection of the third submittal by HAFB after approxi-
mately one and one-half months had expired, Mr. Sakai was 
faced with the deadline for gettin the project completed 
and had seen three submittals provided by PSC and three sub-
mittals rejected. To hold that a course of dealing had been 
established and that PSC should be permitted to make another 
submittal because of the contract between PSC and K.E. 
Systems is not supported by the evidence and is completely 
erroneous. 
These findings of fact do not give effect to the 
time constraints faced by K.E. Systems and the knowledge of 
PSC of these time constraints. 
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FINDING OF FACT NO. 11 
The lower court erred in its findings of fact No. 11 
which states: 
"At the time that the contract was executed, PSC's 
manufactures representativef (Data Site-Utah) "Data 
Site" advises K.E. Systems that PSC would commence 
the manufacture of the 500 kilowatt unit in order to 
complete manufacture and delivery within the 
twenty-two week period." 
This fact was confirmed in a letter from PSC to K.E. 
Systems dated September 11 , 1984. Not only did Mr. Sakai never 
explicitely authorize to commence manufacture of the five hun-
dred kilowatt unit as stated in the findings of fact No. 11, but 
Mr. Sakai specifically told PSC not to begin the manufacture 
of the equipment until PSC had the approval from HAFB in its 
hands. (Transcript 000554 and 555) Thus, it should be found 
that the evidence in the record does not support this 
finding of fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 30 
The lower court erred in part in its findings of fact 
No. 30 in the same manner and for the same reasons it 
erred in its findings of fact No. 11. Findings of Fact No. 
30 reads as follows: 
"As of October 26, 1984, K.E. Systems was aware that 
PSC was in the process of manufacturing the 500 
kilowatt unit to be supplied in the contract." 
Again the lower court erred in not completing this 
finding of factr thus rendering it inaccurate and not 
supported by the evidence of the record. 
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Mr. Sakai was aware that PSC was in the process of 
manufacturing the five hundred kilowatt unit and explicitly 
warned PSC not to begin the manufacture of this unit until 
it had received the approval of HAFB. The fact that Mr. Sakai 
had no control over the activities of PSC with respect to the 
manufacturing of the five hundred kilowatt unit coupled 
with the fact that he specifically told PSC not to begin 
the process of manufacture of the five hundred kilowatt unit 
until PSC had the submittal approval in its hands 
illustrates that PSC took it upon itself and assumed the 
risk of manufacturing the unit without approval for its 
submittals. Mr. Sakai should not be deemed to have assumed 
that risk. 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 26 
The lower court erred in part in its findings of fact 
No. 26. This finding states: 
"That at no time prior to November 1, 1984, did K.E. 
Systems advise PSCf or did PSC receive notice at (a) 
The EPE submittal had een sent to HAFBf (b) the EPE 
submittal had been approved by HAFB (c) the EPE 
equipment had been ordered, (d) any reason existed for 
the disapproval of the third PSC submittal other than 
Clause (F) on the warranty, (e) disapproval of the 
third PSC submittal required resubmittal within ten 
days or (f) there existed any limitation on PSC's 
ability to make further submittals." 
With respect to part (f) of finding of fact 26, again 
this finding was not complete and inaccurate and not 
supported by the evidence in the record. While it is true 
that K.E. Systems did not specifically advise PSC that 
there existed any limitation on PSC's ability to make 
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further submittals. The record clearly indicates that PSC 
held itself out to have had significant experience in 
dealing with government agencies, contracts and submittals 
of the type involved in this dispute. (Transcript 325 and 
326) In addition, it has been shown that PSC knew of the 
time constraints and the twenty-two week deadline faced by 
K.E. Systems. Thus the evidence of the case indicates that 
PSC knew or should have known independent of any 
communication from Mr. Sakai that PSC knew they had only a 
limited time and a limited number of opportunities to gain 
approval for the submittals in order to meet the twenty-two 
week delivery schedule. It was not necessary nor was it 
required of K.E. Systems to point this out to PSC. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 29 AND 36 
Finding of Fact No. 29 is simply irrelevant. The 
evidence in the records shows that three submittals had 
been rejected by this time by HAFB. K.E. Systems had at 
all times rendered strict compliance with the contract 
between itself and PSCf but PSC breached the contract by 
not submitting a submittal which had gained the approval 
of HAFB. This breach by PSC had occurred before the fourth 
submittal. K.E. Systems was not required under the contract 
to submit any more of PSC's submittal to HAFB. 
This also applies to finding of fact No. 36, which 
states: 
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"On November 19, 1984, K.E. Systems instructed 
HAFB to disregard any PSC submittal forward 
directly to HAFB. The copy of the Fourth PSC 
was then sent to K.E. Systems without review or 
consideration." 
Again, as the evidence on the record shows, PSC had already 
breached its contract with K.E. Systems and therefore, any 
actions by K.E. Systems after the breach by PSC Were irre-
levant and should not have been made a finding of fact and 
should not have been made a basis for the final conclusions 
of law. 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 37 
With respect to the finding of fact No. 37 the 
lower Court erred in that this finding was completely irrelevant 
and should not have been used by any basis for a conclusion of 
law. Findings of Fact No. 37 states: 
As of November 19, 1984, PSC was entitled to make 
another submittal to HAFB in order to cure the 
dissaproved items set forth in the completed cover 
sheet to the third PSC submittal and thus fulfill its 
condition to the contract". 
This is a conclusion of law which is simply labeled 
as a statement of fact and this Court should be free to 
review the record without granting any deference to the 
findings of the lower Court. The record clearly supports 
the finding that PSCf by this time, had breached its 
contract with K.E. Systems and was not entitled to cure any 
dissaproval by HAFB or to send in any more submittals to 
HAFB through K.E. Systems. Even if this Court concludes 
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that Finding of Fact No. 37 is a finding of fact this 
findings of fact it is simply not supported by the evidence 
in the record. 
The total sum of the circumstances indicate that 
that PSC had already breached its contract with K.E. 
Systems and it was not entitled to any assistance from K.E. 
Systems or help in attempting to gain approval of any of 
its submittals. 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 41 
The lower Court's findings of fact No. 41f is also a 
conclusion of law labeled as a finding of fact. This court 
may review the record without giving any deference to the 
lower court finding and should hold that K.E. Systems was 
at all times, reasonable in its actions with respect to PSC's 
third and fourth submittals due to the fact that PSC breached 
the contract between K.E. Systems by failing to obtain HAFB's 
approval. The rejections by HAFB support the fact that PSC 
had breached the contract with K.E. Systems and K.E. Systems 
was not required to deal with PSC after a rejection by HAFB 
of the third submittal. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW No. 3 
The lower court erred in its conclusion of law No. 3. 
The facts indicated in Cahoon vs. Cahoon 641 P2d 140, 144 
(Utah 1982) , are simply inapplicable to the present case. 
The extreme nature of Cahoony in factf argues against 
applying to those facts to the record in this case. As 
stated previously, this Court held in Zions Properties, 
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Inc. v. Holt, 538 P2d 1319 (Utah 1975), that if there is 
any interference with a performance of contract it must be 
something that is so substantial that it could be 
reasonably deemed to vindicate the other's refusal to 
perform. Although PSC complains about K. E. Systems1 
interference with performance of its contract, the simple 
fact of the matter is that PSC was unable to obtain 
approval from HAFB due to PSC's failure to meet government 
requirements. This was solely under the control of and the 
responsibility of PSC. The record clearly demonstrates 
that Mr. Stewart at HAFB, who was making the decisions as 
to whether or not a submittal accepted or rejected was 
acting independently of Mr. Sakai and K.E. Systems. (See 
Transcript 705) 
This is also true regarding Mr. Stewart's approval of 
EPE's proposal. (See transcript page 705 & 706) Mr. Stewart 
made his decision based upon his own judgment and experience 
regarding the specifications and warranties the government 
required. (Transcript page 706) 
PSC trys to portray K.E. Systems as interfering with 
its ability to obtain a contract and not providing it 
sufficient information. But as the records shows, Mr. Stewart 
talked with Tom Glandon on several occasions. Mr. Stewart 
never prohibited Mr. Glandon from calling him. Thus, the 
information was always available to PSC to enable PSC to 
conform its submittal and to gain HAFB approval. (See 
transcript, page 707 through 709) 
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CONCLDSIONS OP LAW, NO. 4 and NO. 5 
The lower Court erred in its conclusion of law No. 4 
in holding that the acts of K.E. Systems constituted a 
breach and violation of the duties and obligations imposed 
by law upon K.E. Systems. The contract between K.E. 
Systems and PSC had already been breached by PSC failing to 
obtain approval of its submittal by the independent HAFB 
personnel during the first three attempts. This is also 
true of the lower Courtfs conclusions of Law No. 5. K.E. 
Systems was not charged by law to assist PSC after PSCfs 
third rejection. K.E. Systems did aid PSC in .its attempt 
to gain approval of the first three submittals by HAFB. As 
previously indicated, the transcript indicates that Mr. 
Stewart was completely independent in his evaluation 
proposals and rejections. PSC had tried three times and 
had failed three times to gain approval of its submittals 
and this consitituted a breach of contract. The contract 
had already been breached by the time K.E. Systems refused 
to forward any further submittals to HAFB. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 6 
The lower Court erred in its Conclusions of Law No. 6 
in that it was not K.E. Systems that breached the contract, 
but, rather, it was PSC that breached the contract by its 
failure to gain approval for its submittals. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in finding that K. E. Systems 
wilfully interferred with PSC which interference substan-
tially contributed to PSCfs failure to obtain HAFB 
approval of PSC's submittals* This Court should reverse 
the lower court and hold that PSC, by its own acts, breached 
the contract between itself and K.E. Systems. Furtherf 
this court should grant the relief sought by the appellant 
on its counterclaim. 
^JTMr MITSUNAGA 71 
Attorney for the Defendant-Appellant 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
CERTIFICATION OF DELIVERY 
Hand delivered four copies of the foregoing Reply of 
Defendant-Appellant to Eric C. Olsen, of Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy, attorneys for the Plaintiff-Respondent on 
this 24th day of September, 1986, at 5JL South Main Street, 
Suite 1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144, 
^<Jlmi Mitsuhaga 
-12-
